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Abstract 
A challenge in Information Systems Design Science Research (ISDSR) is the evaluation of constructed 
Information Systems Design Theories. March and Smith (1995, p. 254) state that “significant difficul-
ties … result from the fact that artifact performance is related to the environment in which it oper-
ates.” Therefore, it is nearly impossible to achieve stable knowledge of the utility of ISDSR artifacts. 
This is a severe problem because—as in each scientific discipline—it should be able to show that there 
is progress in ISDSR. In this paper, we propose an approach for improving the stability of knowledge 
of the utility of ISDSR artifacts. We focus on instability resulting from the social setting of an evalua-
tion context. By applying Habermas’s Discourse Theory, we show why a separation of stakeholder 
types is essential for gaining stable knowledge on the utility of ISDTs. 
Keywords: Information Systems Design Science Research, Information Systems Design Theory, 
Progress, Evaluation, Stability. 
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1 The Issue of Evaluating Information Systems Design Theories 
Information Systems Design Science Research (ISDSR) is an emerging paradigm (Kuechler et al., 
2007). In the context of ISDSR, some authors argue to develop Information Systems Design Theories 
(ISDTs) (cf. the analyses by Venable, 2006b; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008a; Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 
2008b). Since the basic contribution by Walls et al. (1992), ISDTs have been discussed in a variety of 
publications (Gregor, 2002; Markus et al., 2002; Goldkuhl, 2004; Walls et al., 2004; Gregor, 2006; 
Venable, 2006b; Venable, 2006a; Gregor & Jones, 2007; Gregor, 2009; Aier & Fischer, 2010). In this 
paper, we use the simple definition by Baskerville et al. (2009) and define a design theory as a “gener-
al solution to a class of problems”. A design theory links a solution space to a problem space, thereby 
predicting a specific amount of utility (Venable, 2006b). 
An important aim of any science, including ISDSR, is to achieve progress. In order to stress that 
progress and science belong together, Kuhn (1970, p. 162) poses the following rhetorical question: 
“Does a field make progress because it is a science, or is it a science because it makes progress?” 
Progress is generally defined as the step from a stage A to a stage B whereby B is “better” than A (Nii-
niluoto, 2007). Any endeavor that is worth to be called scientific should therefore be able to show its 
contribution to progress. Critical rationalism is also concerned with scientific progress. Popper under-
stands science as an endeavor that approaches “truth” by formulating theories and by permanently try-
ing to falsify them. As long as a theory has not been falsified, it can be pragmatically regarded as an 
approximation to truth (verisimilitude) (confer; Popper, 1935/1959; Popper, 1963). Then, a theory that 
has not been falsified for a long time is stable theoretical knowledge. It is stable because it can be de-
fended against any argument, e.g., against experiment results or other observations. 
In order to show scientific progress, the outcome of ISDSR has to be evaluated (March & Smith, 
1995; Hevner et al., 2004; Peffers et al., 2007; Pries-Heje et al., 2008). “We evaluate artifacts to de-
termine if we have made any progress” (March & Smith, 1995, p. 258). The most important criterion 
for evaluating a design theory is its utility (although it is not the only one, cf. Aier and Fischer (2009)). 
However, March and Smith (1995) identify an important problem related to the evaluation of an arti-
fact’s utility: “Significant difficulties … result from the fact that artifact performance is related to the 
environment in which it operates” (March & Smith, 1995, p. 254). This problem is severe. If an arti-
fact’s performance highly depends upon its environment, a judgment on its contribution to progress is 
hardly possible. To this end, stable knowledge of an artifacts’ utility is necessary.  
Then, the basic question arises: How can influences of the evaluation environment be reduced such 
that we attain stable knowledge on the utility of an ISDT? In our research, we found that Jürgen Ha-
bermas’s discourse theory gives a helpful definition of stability (Habermas, 1973; Habermas, 
1981/1984; Habermas, 1999/2003). He does not primarily refer to stability over time or over contexts; 
his notion of stability is discursive: knowledge is stable if it can be defended against any argument. 
Habermas does not only give a definition of stability, but he also enumerates preconditions under 
which such stable knowledge can be attained. These preconditions are called “ideal discourse”. We 
argue that we can learn from Habermas for the evaluation of ISDTs. 
The problem our paper deals with can be summarized by three propositions: 
(1) It is essential for any science to show its contribution to progress (Kuhn, 1970). 
(2) For judging the progressivity of ISDTs, stable knowledge of their utility is needed. 
(3) The artifact’s performance is dependent on the evaluation environment (March & Smith, 1995); 
therefore, instable knowledge of the utility of ISDTs results from an artifact’s evaluation. 
A prospective approach for solving this problem is based on the following proposition: 
(4) Habermas’s discourse theory defines a discursive notion of stability of knowledge (Habermas, 
1973; Habermas, 1981/1984; Habermas, 1999/2003). 
 
 
We assume that an analysis of Habermas’s preconditions for an ideal discourse will help us to under-
stand how to better gain stable knowledge on the utility of ISDTs. Especially the fact that Habermas 
does not only define stability, but also enumerates preconditions for attaining such stable knowledge 
encourages that our assumption might be correct. In order to verify this assumption, we would like to 
invite the reader to a thought experiment. At the end of this long journey, we will find out that a sepa-
ration of stakeholder types will be necessary for attaining stable knowledge of the utility of ISDTs.  
For developing this insight, we structure our paper as follows: Firstly, we show Habermas’s discourse 
theory as foundations. Secondly, we apply Habermas’s discourse theory to the evaluation of ISDTs, 
analyze challenges, and formulate the thesis sketched above as a result. Finally, we discuss the find-
ing, showing related work as well as strengths and limitations of our paper. 
2 Habermas’s Discourse Theory 
Habermas’s work is vast and complex. Therefore, we are forced to restrict ourselves to those aspects 
of Habermas’s Discourse Theory that we consider to be most relevant for the argumentation in this 
paper. Moreover, Habermas’s contributions have been discussed by the best living philosophers and 
sociologists over the world; and, in accordance with his theory, he changed some of his propositions in 
response to criticism. For this reason, Habermas’s work is relatively heterogeneous. We therefore have 
to select his main contributions to be studied for this paper. Most of our argumentation relies on Ha-
bermas’s main work: The Theory of communicative action (firstly published in German, English trans-
lation in 1984). In addition, we consider his early paper on theories of truth (Wahrheitstheorien, Ha-
bermas, 1973) that Habermas had never allowed to be translated because he revised his opinion pre-
sented therein later-on. This revision is mainly documented in his paper Truth and Justification 
(1999/2003), which we also studied. In order to consider his entire work, we moreover used secondary 
literature, such as the article on Habermas by Bohman and Rehg (2009) published in Stanford Encyc-
lopedia of Philosophy. As we consider Bohman and Rehg’s (2009) article to be very comprehensive, 
we strongly orientate our presentation of Habermas’s Discourse Theory at their summary. 
Habermas’s Discourse Theory is based upon the assumption that language is a medium for coordinat-
ing action. “Coordination through language requires speakers to adopt a practical stance toward 
‘reaching understanding’, which he regards as the ‘inherent telos’ of speech. When actors address one 
another with this sort of practical attitude, they engage in what Habermas calls ‘communicative ac-
tion’, which he distinguishes from strategic forms of social action. […] In strategic action, actors are 
not so much interested in mutual understanding as in achieving the individual goals they each bring to 
the situation” (Bohman & Rehg, 2009, section 3.1). An example for a strategic form of action is a co-
operation of an actor A with an actor B, not because A finds B’s goals inherently interesting or worthy, 
but because of what A gets out of the bargain. In strong communicative actions, in contrast, speakers 
coordinate their action and pursuit of individual (or joint) goals on the basis of a shared understanding 
that the goals are inherently reasonable or merit-worthy. In communicative action, actors freely agree 
that their goal is reasonable. At that end of a strong communicative action, social cooperation is both 
deeply consensual and reasonable: actors sincerely agree that their modes of cooperation can be justi-
fied as good, right, and free of empirical error.  
In order that a communicative action succeeds in reaching understanding, the hearer must take up an 
affirmative position toward the claim made by the speaker. “In doing so, the hearer presumes that the 
claims in the speech act could be supported by good reasons […]. When the offer made by the speaker 
fails to receive uptake, speaker and hearer may shift reflexive levels, from ordinary speech to ‘dis-
course’—processes of argumentation and dialogue in which the claims implicit in the speech act are 
tested for their rational justifiability as true, correct or authentic” (Bohman & Rehg, 2009). 
Habermas distinguishes different types of validity claims (German: Geltungsansprüche). The term 
validity claim connotes the idea that a claim, i.e., a statement, merits the addressee’s acceptance be-
cause it is justified or true in some sense. In order to be acceptable, successful speech acts must satisfy 
 
 
the demands connected with three basic validity claims: sincerity, rightness, and truth. To recognize 
the validity of such claims is to presume that good reasons could be given to justify them in the face of 
criticism. As we are interested in truth (or justifiability) of teleological actions in the paper at hand 
(i.e., claims referring to the utility of ISDTs), we are mainly concerned with cognitive-instrumental 
expressions, related to the validity claim “truth of propositions and efficacy of teleological actions” 
(cf. table of validity claims in Habermas, 1981/1984, p. 23). Each type of validity claim requires a 
specific type of argumentative practice appropriate for its justification. The appropriate type of argu-
mentative practice for determining truth of propositions or efficacy of teleological actions is the Ha-
bermasian theoretical discourse. (In contrast, the Habermasian practical discourse, for instance, deals 
with the rightness of norms of actions; it is therefore a moral discourse.)  
 
1 No one capable of making a relevant contribution has been excluded.  
2 Participants have equal voice. 
3 Participants are internally free to speak their honest opinion without deception or self-deception. 
4 There are no sources of coercion built into the process and procedures of discourse. 
Table 1: Pragmatic presuppositions of participants of a discourse that is meant to be a severe 
critical test (ideal discourse), according to Habermas (2005, p. 85)1 
The quality of an argument depends on how well one has taken into account all relevant information 
and possible objections. Therefore, robust “critical testing of competing arguments depends on the 
rhetorical quality of the persuasive process. Habermas conceives the rhetorical level in terms of highly 
idealized properties of communication, which he initially presented as the conditions of an ‘ideal 
speech situation’ (Habermas, 1973; ...). That way of speaking now strikes him as overly reified, sug-
gesting an ideal condition that real discourses must measure up to, or at least approximately satisfy—
motifs that Habermas himself employed until rather recently […]. He now understands the idea of rhe-
torically adequate process as a set of unavoidable yet counterfactual ‘pragmatic presuppositions’ that 
participants must make if they are to regard the actual execution of dialectical procedures as a suffi-
ciently severe critical test” (Bohman & Rehg, 2009, section 3.2). Habermas (2005, p. 89) proposes 
four such presuppositions: (1) No one capable of making a relevant contribution is excluded; (2) all 
participants have equal voice; (3) all participants are internally free to speak their honest opinion with-
out deception or self-deception; and (4) there are no sources of coercion built into the process and pro-
cedures of discourse (cf. Table 1). The four presuppositions can be summarized as full inclusion, non-
coercion, and equality. Referring to the last three presuppositions, an ideal discourse is also sometimes 
called a hierarchy-free discourse.  
“These conditions are counterfactual in the sense that actual discourses can rarely realize—and can 
never empirically certify—full inclusion, non-coercion, and equality. At the same time, these idealiz-
ing presuppositions have an operative effect on actual discourse: we may regard outcomes (both con-
sensual and non-consensual) as reasonable only if our scrutiny of the process does not uncover ob-
vious exclusions, suppression of arguments, manipulation, self-deception, and the like (Habermas, 
1999/2003, p. 108). In this sense, these pragmatic idealizations function as ‘standards for a self-
correcting learning process’ (Habermas, 2005, p. 91)” (Bohman & Rehg, 2009, section 2.3). For sim-
plifying our terminology, we call, in accordance with Habermas’s early works, a discourse that fulfils 
these conditions an ideal discourse. 
In his early contributions, especially in Habermas (1973), Habermas equated empirical truth with ideal 
justifiability. But, confronted with rough critique, Habermas quickly realized that such a consensus 
theory of truth downplays the metaphysical character of truth. He therefore developed a different no-
                                              
1  The table is based on the translation by Bohman and Rehg (2009, section 3.2). 
 
 
tion of truth, published in Habermas (1999/2003)—and never allowed his early contribution on theo-
ries of truth (Habermas, 1973) to appear in English (Bohman & Rehg, 2009, section 3.3). Habermas 
now proposes a theory of truth that “is realist in holding that the objective world, rather than ideal con-
sensus, is the truth-maker. If a proposition (or sentence, statement) for which we claim truth is indeed 
true, it is so because it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of 
affairs—albeit objects and states of affairs about which we can state facts only under descriptions that 
depend on our linguistic resources. […] Habermas eschews the attempt to explicate the relationship 
between proposition and world metaphysically (e.g., as in correspondence theories). Rather, he expli-
cates the meaning of accurate representation pragmatically, in terms of its implications for everyday 
practice and discourse. Insofar as we take propositional contents as unproblematically true in our daily 
practical engagement with reality, we act confidently on the basis of well-corroborated beliefs about 
objects in the world. What Habermas (1981/1984, p. 23) calls ‘theoretico-empirical’ or ‘theoretical’ 
discourse becomes necessary when beliefs lose their unproblematic status as the result of practical dif-
ficulties, or when novel circumstances pose questions about the natural world. Such cases call for an 
empirical inquiry in which truth claims about the world are submitted to critical testing” (Bohman & 
Rehg, 2009, section 3.3). 
In summary, according to Habermas’s Discourse Theory, the validity of claims referring to the truth of 
propositions or the efficacy of teleological actions can be tested in a special type of ideal discourse: a 
theoretical discourse. Critical testing of validity claims requires speakers to adopt a practical stance 
toward reaching understanding. At the end of such a discourse, social cooperation is both deeply con-
sensual and reasonable: actors sincerely agree that their modes of cooperation can be justified as free 
of empirical error. Pragmatic presuppositions of participants of such a discourse can be summarized as 
full inclusion, non-coercion, and equality (cf. Table 1); sometimes, it is also called hierarchy-free dis-
course.  
3 Applying Habermas’s Discourse Theory 
After having outlined Habermas’s discourse theory, we analyze how to apply it to the evaluation of 
ISDTs. We start our argumentation with an analysis of the form of utility statements—or utility 
claims. A formal definition of utility claims is a necessary condition for conducting a sound analysis 
based upon Habermas’s Discourse Theory. Thereafter, we test to what extent Habermas’s require-
ments for an ideal discourse are realized in a real business context. We firstly apply Habermas’s 
theory in a naïve way. However, as we will see, a different approach is necessary for achieving stable 
knowledge of the utility of ISDTs. Based on the analysis’ results of the naïve application of Haber-
mas’s Theory, we propose an approach for realizing stable knowledge about the utility of ISDTs. 
3.1 Formalizing Statements on the Utility of ISDTs 
Almost every author on ISDSR or IS Design Theories (ISDT) emphasizes the utility of ISDTs (cf. Ta-
ble 2). Nonetheless, the term utility remains fuzzy as we could not find any publication which concre-
tizes what is meant by utility of an artifact or an ISDT. However, such a formalized definition of utili-
ty statements—or, as Habermas would say, utility claims—is crucial for a sound analysis based on 
Habermas’s Discourse Theory. 
We start our analysis with a discussion concerning theories of truth which is held in philosophy. As 
shown above, Habermas’s Discourse Theory is related to theories of truth—although Habermas re-
vised his early work later-on. For our analysis, we first introduce the linguistic distinction in philoso-
phy between truthmakers and truthbearers. This distinction can be transferred to Habermas’s Theory: 
The term truthbearer refers to “things of which it makes sense to ask whether they are true or false” 
(David, 2009, section 2.1; cf. also Glanzberg, 2009, section 2.1). Common candidates for truthbearers 
are “beliefs, thoughts, ideas, judgments, statements, assertions, utterances, sentences, and proposi-
tions” (David, 2009, section 2.1). In contrast, a “truthmaker is anything that makes some truthbearer 
 
 
true” (David, 2009, section 2.1; cf. also Glanzberg, 2009, section 3.3). Truthbearers and truthmakers 
should therefore correspond to each other. Depending on the truthbearer, common candidates for 
truthmakers are “facts, states of affairs, events, things, tropes, etc.” (David, 2009, section 2.2). 
 
Source Citation 
Baskerville (2009, p. 1) “[T]he artifact represents a general solution to a class of Problems.” 
Hevner et al. (2004, p. 80) “The goal of design science research is utility.”  
March and Smith (1995, p. 253) “Its products [i.e. products of design science research] are assessed against 
criteria of value or utility.”  
Walls et al. (1992, p. 40) “Design theories must deal with goals as contingencies.” 
Winter (2008, p. 40) “IS design science research aims at utility. ... Since design-oriented IS re-
search is aimed at the construction of ‘better’ IS-related problem solutions, 
utility for practice is established as a clear and common measure of its re-
sults’ relevance.” 
Table 2.  Exemplary citations on the utility, the goal-orientation, or the problem-solving capaci-
ty of ISDTs 
If we are to understand Habermas’s Discourse Theory as a theory of truth, truthbearers in his theory 
would be claims. As shown above, Habermas differentiates five types of claims. So, what kind of 
claim is a “utility claim” when referring to ISDTs? To answer this question, we discuss different can-
didates for utility claims. 
On the one hand, an artifact can be useful for an individual. An individual has specific interests and 
goals, and the artifact might help the individual to achieve these goals. Imagine that Mary intends to 
drive a nail into a wall; then, she might consider a hammer to be useful for her. We call the utility 
claim “A hammer is useful for Mary” a subjective utility claim, and formalize the first candidate for a 
utility claim as follows: 
Claim C1: Artifact a is useful for person p.  
(Subjective utility claim, e.g., “A hammer is useful for Mary.”) 
On the other hand, a utility claim could state that an artifact is objectively useful for solving a particu-
lar problem or reaching a particular goal. Baskerville (2009, p. 1) relates the artifact to a class of prob-
lems; Winter (2008, p. 40) takes a similar approach. Walls et al. (1992, p. 40) stress that IS design 
theories deal with goals (cf. Table 2). These three examples can be formalized in the form of objective 
utility claims as follows: 
Claim C2: Artifact a is useful for reaching goal g/for solving problem p/…  
(Objective utility claim, e.g., “A hammer is useful for driving a nail into a wall.”) 
The connection between candidate C1 and candidate C2 is obvious. C1 is not opposed to C2, but both 
complement one another. The subjective formulation of the utility claim presupposes that the individ-
ual intends to reach a goal or to solve a problem: If Mary did not intend to drive a nail into a wall, then 
a hammer would not be useful for her. On the other hand, only a (rationale) subject can have a goal or 
an intention.2 A goal is unthinkable without a subject that has this goal. Therefore, a goal implies the 
existence of a subject that has this goal/intention. The connection between both is explicated in the 
following candidate for a utility claim: 
Claim C3: Artifact a is useful for person p who intends to reach goal g/to solve problem 
p/… 
                                              
2  Of course, in everyday language, objects are sometimes personified. For instance, one might say: “Be aware of that 
computer virus. It wants to delete all your e-mails.” Nevertheless, we would never argue that the computer virus acts in-
tentionally. Intentional action presupposes rationality; and rationality is reserved for subjects. 
 
 
(Subjective utility claim with explicated intention, e.g., “A hammer is useful for Mary, 
who intends to drive a nail into a wall.”) 
Which of these claims are suitable for a stable utility claim? It is obvious that a candidate for a stable 
utility claim should be independent of any specific subject. Therefore, claim C2 seems to be the most 
stable utility claim of the three candidates proposed. This is not surprising; the citations shown in Ta-
ble 2 are, at a first glance, all independent of subjects. But, as shown above when introducing the third 
claim, a goal (and similarly a problem) presupposes a (rationale) subject. Therefore, claim 2 is only 
seemingly independent of a subject. As claim 3 explicates this relation, we will continue our argumen-
tation with claim 3. 
So, how can we—based on Habermas’s Discourse Theory—justify a stable utility claim that has the 
form of claim C3? In the introduction, we defined a stable claim to be a claim that can be defended 
against any argument. We then presented Habermas’s Discourse theory in which he describes an ideal 
discourse situation. The validity of a claim referring to the efficacy of a teleological action can be 
“tested” in theoretical discourse. The better the participants of such a discourse respect the rules for an 
ideal discourse listed in Table 1, the more we can be sure that the claim can be defended against any 
argument. Thus, the theoretical discourse allows for a generalization of the utility claim C3. The per-
sonal claim of Mary, “A hammer is useful for me who intends to drive a nail into a wall,” becomes an 
inter-subjectively accepted claim: “A hammer is useful for those of us who intend to drive a nail into a 
wall.” We formulate claim C4 as an inter-subjective claim: 
Claim C4: Artifact a is useful for the group of persons G whose members intend to reach 
goal g/to solve problem p/…  
(Inter-subjectively validated utility claim with explicated intention which results from an 
ideal theoretical discourse, e.g., “A hammer is useful for the group of craftspeople, who 
intend to drive a nail into a wall.”) 
We could now define guidelines for how to realize an ideal discourse for ISDT evaluation. Research-
ers could, for instance, try to establish an ideal discourse situation by conducting a focus group.3 But, 
the requirements for an ideal discourse seem to fundamentally contradict the structure of enterprises. 
Enterprises are usually hierarchical organizations, so how can we achieve a hierarchy-free discourse in 
which the presuppositions shown in Table 1 are respected by all participants? And how can an ISDT’s 
evaluation be interpreted if it results from a hierarchy-free discourse, but is meant to be implemented 
in a strongly hierarchical environment? These two questions are discussed in the following subsection. 
3.2 Why a Naïve Application of Habermas’s Discourse Theory does not Re-
sult in Stable Knowledge of the Utility of ISDTs 
Habermas suggests not excluding anyone from an ideal discourse who is capable of making a relevant 
contribution. When an instantiation of any innovative IS artifact is implemented in an enterprise, then 
usually a variety of stakeholders are concerned. According to Habermas, all these stakeholders have 
the potential to make relevant contributions. Moreover, all participants should have equal voice. 
In management literature, stakeholder theory is discussed. “A stakeholder in an organization is (by 
definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organiza-
tion’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). Stakeholder theory can be used instrumentally because “it 
establishes a framework for examining the connections, if any, between the practice of stakeholder 
management and the achievement of various corporate performance goals” (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995, pp. 66–67). In practitioner literature on project management, such an instrumental use of stake-
holder theory, called stakeholder analysis, is strongly recommended for project managers, i.e., the 
                                              
3  We take focus groups as an example, here. However, we will argue that our findings are not restricted to focus groups. 
 
 
identification of stakeholders and their influence on the project (cf., e.g., Project Management Insti-
tute, 2004, pp. 27–32). At least since Markus’s (1983) seminal article, we have known that power and 
politics highly influence the acceptance of Management Information Systems. Therefore, it is fully 
justified that an IS project manager who is interested in the success of his or her project should consid-
er project stakeholders and their influence or power. 
Imagine now that a focus group is organized with the aim of evaluating the utility of a particular 
ISDT. Following Habermas’s requirements, no one capable of making a relevant contribution has been 
excluded—i.e., all stakeholders are present. Further imagine that we tell all participants that each of 
them has an equal voice, that they should feel free to speak their honest opinion, and that no one may 
exert coercion on any other participant. Incidentally, from the background described above, it is unrea-
listic that stakeholders who are used to exercising power on each other and to playing political games 
should begin to discuss in such an ideal (i.e., hierarchy-free) setting of discourse, simply because they 
are asked to do so. But, this is not the point of our argument. The point is: If they accepted the condi-
tions of an ideal discourse an IS design science researcher could not interpret the results of such an 
ideal (i.e., hierarchy-free) discourse. The results could not be interpreted because, in a real business 
situation, participants would (certainly) argue differently. Some stakeholders would (certainly) be 
more powerful than others. It could be that some were excluded from the discourse, and it is even 
thinkable that some exert coercion on others. In result, a decision on the utility of the ISDT in a real 
business context would fundamentally differ from a consensus resulting from an unrealistic hierarchy-
free discourse. 
3.3 How Habermas’s Theory should be Applied for Reaching Stable Know-
ledge of the Utility of ISDTs 
So, is Habermas’s Discourse Theory useless for the evaluation of ISDTs? We argue that it is not use-
less, but that it has to be applied in a different way than described above. Remember that our aim here 
is stable utility claims. We defined that a utility claim is the more stable the better it can be defended 
against arguments. For analyzing utility claims, we formalized three types of utility claims (C1, C2, 
and C3); the third claim explicated implicit presuppositions of the first and second ones. It had the fol-
lowing form: “Artifact a is useful for person p who intends to reach goal g/to solve problem p/…” The 
problem with the “naïve” approach sketched above is that it ignores the fact that different stakeholders 
have different goals. Markus (1983), for instance, analyses a case study on the introduction of a finan-
cial information system (FIS) and states: 
“Corporate accountants designed and used FIS to create a substantial change in the distri-
bution of, or access to, financial data, a valued resource. It is not surprising that those 
who gained access (corporate accountants) were pleased with the system and that those 
who lost control (divisional accountants) resisted it by writing angry memos, maintaining 
parallel systems, engaging in behavior that jeopardized the integrity of the database, and 
participating in a task force with the public objective of eliminating FIS and replacing it 
with another system” (Markus, 1983, p. 438). 
This example shows that different stakeholders often have different goals and different expectations 
with respect to information systems. In the transition from claim C3 to the inter-subjectively accepted 
claim C4, the persons who consider the claim to be valid vary from an individual to a group; but the 
goal g, and respectively the problem p, remain invariant in the transition from C3 to C4. So the “solu-
tion” of our problem is not to try to achieve a consensus among different stakeholders who have 
slightly different goals, but to separate different stakeholder types. Then and only then, we will have 
the chance to gain stable knowledge on the utility of ISDTs because the members of each of the dis-
courses all have, by definition, the same goal g and respectively intend to solve the same problem p. 
The price for such a separation, of course, is that we cannot reduce the utility of an ISDT to a single 
dimension. The question rises how to react to the problem that knowledge is now no longer compara-
ble. A strongly relativist view holding that even contradictory knowledge of different individuals 
 
 
could be true is not helpful from the authors’ point of view. Restrictions of article length do not allow 
us to discuss this issue extensively. However, we would like to remark that it reflects an inherent com-
plexity of socio-technical systems which cannot be reduced.  
 
 Stakeholder Type 1 Stakeholder Type 2 Stakeholder Type 3 
Company A pros/cons pros/cons pros/cons 
Company B pros/cons pros/cons not existent 
Company C pros/cons not existent pros/cons 
Table 3:  Fictional Example 
Before discussing the contribution of this paper, however, we would like to illustrate our idea by refer-
ring to a small, fictional example. In Table 3, we list three stakeholder types (1–3) and three compa-
nies (A–C). In company A, stakeholders of all three types could be identified. In companies B and C 
stakeholders of type 3 and type 2 respectively do not exist. In a naïve evaluation based on Habermas’s 
Discourse Theory, we would strive for a consensus among all stakeholder types, based on an ideal dis-
course. We argue that such a consensus cannot be interpreted because decisions taken in business are 
not based on the results of a hierarchy-free discourse. We therefore argue to strive for a consensus 
among the stakeholders of each type; i.e., to strive for a consensus between stakeholders of type 1 
from companies A, B, and C, between stakeholders of type 2 from companies A and B; and, finally, 
between stakeholders of type 3 from companies A and C.  
4 Discussion 
4.1 Summary 
Our argumentation can be summarized as follows (points (1)–(4a) are taken from the introduction): 
(1) It is essential for any science to show its contribution to progress (Kuhn, 1970). 
(2) For judging the progressivity of ISDTs, stable knowledge of their utility is needed. 
(3) The artifact’s performance is dependent on the evaluation environment (March & Smith, 1995); 
therefore, instable knowledge of the utility of ISDTs results from an artifact’s evaluation. 
(4) (a) Habermas’s discourse theory defines a discursive notion of stability of knowledge. (b) He 
enumerates preconditions for attaining stable knowledge: stakeholders agree on that knowledge in 
an ideal (or hierarchy-free) discourse (Habermas, 1973; Habermas, 1981/1984; Habermas, 
199/2003). 
(5) When evaluating an ISDT, we single utility claims that encompass (i) an ISDT, (ii) a goal, and 
(iii) the individual that pursues this goal and that performs the evaluation. Generalized utility 
claims are independent of the individual (cf. section 3.1). 
(6) Habermas’s discourse theory proposes a way to achieve generalized, stable utility claims: Individ-
uals agree on the utility of an ISDT in a hierarchy-free discourse.  
(7) Enterprises are usually hierarchical organizations. Even if individuals from a hierarchical organi-
zation came to a consensus in a hierarchy-free discourse, this consensus could not be interpreted 
for the hierarchical organization. (In a real business situation, it would only be a coincidence if the 
result of a discourse was the same as that of a hierarchy-free discourse.) The problem is that dif-
ferent stakeholders have different goals. 
(8) Therefore, for attaining stable knowledge of the utility of ISDTs, the utility evaluation results 
should be aggregated separately for every stakeholder type. 
 
 
4.2 Related Work 
We reviewed literature on IS research methods, IS design science, and IS philosophy and searched for 
a link to Habermas’s discourse theory. We found two epistemological frameworks referring to Haber-
mas’s discourse theory: Becker and Niehaves (2007) propose an epistemological framework, based 
upon a literature review. On one layer of their framework, notions of truth are differentiated, among 
them the consensus theory of truth referred to by Habermas (1973; 1981/1984). In addition to the lite-
rature reviewed by Becker and Niehaves (2007), we identified Frank (2006) as a publication on theo-
ries of truth in IS. Both Becker & Niehaves (2007) as well as Frank (2006) consider Habermas’s 
theory as a means for justifying IS research results. Moreover, we found literature on evaluations in 
focus groups which are partly based on Habermas’s discourse theory (Gibson & Arnott, 2007; Trem-
blay et al., 2008; Tremblay et al., 2010). But, none of these authors discusses the aspect of stability. To 
the best of our knowledge, our research is original. 
4.3 Implications 
Our proposition to separate stakeholder types has strong consequences. The utility of an ISDT is then 
multi-dimensional: one dimension for each stakeholder type. According to March and Smith (1995, p. 
258), “we evaluate artifacts in order to determine if we have made any progress.” To this end, the utili-
ty of an ISDT has to be compared to state-of-the-art solutions. Such a comparison necessitates a stable 
knowledge of the utility of both ISDTs to be compared. A good implication of our research is that the 
chance of obtaining stable knowledge on the utility of ISDTs has been improved. An unfortunate im-
plication of our research is that utility is multidimensional, one dimension for each stakeholder type. If 
we compare ISDT a with ISDT b, it might be the case that a is more useful for stakeholder type 1 
whilst b is more useful for stakeholder type 2. We argue however that the stakeholder-dependence of 
the utility of an ISDT reflects the inherent complexity of a socio-technical environment. We can there-
fore not be allowed to ignore this complexity if we are interested in valid research results. 
4.4 Limitations and Future Research 
Our research has mainly two limitations. Firstly, we restrict our analysis to the social part of an eval-
uation context. It is indisputable that, by making this restriction, we exclude all kinds of technical de-
pendence from our analysis. Of course, the reason that a particular ISDT performs better in company A 
than in company B can be due to different technical architectures in the respective companies. In this 
paper, we are not concerned with the dependence on the technical part of the evaluation context. It is 
worthwhile to remark, however, that such dependence does not reduce the contribution of our re-
search. Imagine the stakeholders of type 1 shown in Table 3 all have different technical architectures 
in their respective company. Nevertheless, in an (approximately) ideal discourse, participants can dis-
cuss the differences in their respective environments. Moreover, to come to a consensus must not be 
confused with the reduction of the data to a single value for utility. Of course, a consensus can also 
result in a multi-dimensional context. That is, participants might come to the consensus that the ISDT 
in question is useful, for instance, for companies A and C, but not for B, because of differences in 
technical architecture. And—in contrast to consensus among stakeholders of different types, i.e., with 
different goals—such consensus is interpretable, i.e., applicable to real business. Secondly, our re-
search remains a theory-based argumentation. We have not evaluated in practical research if the sepa-
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